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1. INTRODUCTION

During the mid-1980's, a growing drug problem in the United
States, particularly with crack cocaine, became an increasing matter of public and congressional concern.' In response to this perceived crack epidemic, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.2 As part of this statute, Congress enacted enhanced
minimum and maximum sentences for crimes involving "cocaine
base." 3 Under the sentencing scheme enacted by Congress, a person convicted of a crime involving a far smaller amount of "cocaine
base" falls within the same minimum and maximum sentencing
range as a person convicted of a crime involving a much larger
amount of "cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and
salts of isomers."4 Congress has failed to define either "cocaine" or
1. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 95-96 (2007).
2. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 31, 42, 47, 48 U.S.C.).
3. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 95. Congress enacted these enhanced penalties because it:
apparently believed that crack was significantly more dangerous than powder cocaine
in that: (1) crack was highly addictive; (2) crack users and dealers were more likely
to be violent than users and dealers of other drugs; (3) crack was more harmful to users than powder, particularly for children who had been exposed by their mothers'
drug use during pregnancy; (4) crack use was especially prevalent among teenagers;
and (5) crack's potency and low cost were making it increasingly popular.
Id. at 95-96.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006). Section 841(b)(1) contains a two-tier sentencing
scheme for crimes involving different forms of cocaine. It imposes a minimum ten-year and
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"cocaine base" since enacting the statute. 5 Although the circuits
have virtually agreed upon what "cocaine" and "cocaine base" are
for non-statutory purposes, they have not reached an accord on
what those terms encompass when applying the statute. 6
maximum life sentence for crimes involving "5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of. . . cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and
salts of isomers" or "50 grams or more of a mixture or substance ... which contains cocaine
base." Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii). Section 841(b)(1) also imposes a minimum sentence of 5
five years and a maximum sentence of forty years for crimes involving "500 grams or more
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of . . . cocaine, its salts, optical
and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers" or "5 grams or more of a mixture or substance
... which contains cocaine base." Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), (iii).
The language of section 841(b)(1) has sparked challenges in every circuit that it is
void for vagueness due to the similarity of terms "cocaine" and "cocaine base." However, all
of the circuits have addressed this vagueness challenge, and each one has rejected it. See
United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. ColladoGomez, 834 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 319-20 (3d
Cir. 1992); United States v. Wallace, 22 F.3d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1032-33
(6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Collins, 272 F.3d 984, 988-89 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Reed, 897 F.2d 351, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Van Hawkins, 899
F.2d 852, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1557-58 (10th Cir.
1992); United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
5. See 21 U.S.C. § 841.
6. Based upon the opinions addressing this issue, cocaine is also known as cocaine

hydrochloride and has the chemical formula

Of C17H22ClNO 4 or

C17H2 1N0 4HC1.

United

States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438,
462 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Booker, 70 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 1995); Easter, 981
F.2d at 1558; United States v. Sloan, 97 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996). Cocaine hydrochloride derives from the natural cocaine base in the coca leaf, and it is produced through a
two-step process. The first step involves mashing the coca leaves with a strong alkali, like
baking soda or lime; a solvent, like kerosene; and water. United States v. Higgins, 557
F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir. 2009); Booker, 70 F.3d at 490; United States v. Hollis, 490 F.3d
1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
The resulting paste is then dissolved in hydrochloric acid and water. Higgins, 557 F.3d at
393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 490; Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381; Brisbane, 367
F.3d at 911. The substance created by this process, a salt, has a white and powdery appearance that is familiarly known as cocaine to the general public. Higgins, 557 F.3d at
393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 490-91; Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381; Brisbane,
367 F.3d at 911. Cocaine hydrochloride, unlike cocaine base, is water soluble. Barnes, 890
F.2d at 552; Rarbosa, 271 F.3d at 462; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491;
Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. Due to its chemical properties, cocaine
hydrochloride is typically snorted or dissolved and injected. Barnes, 890 F.2d at 552; Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 462; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Sloan, 97 F.3d at
1381; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. Users cannot smoke cocaine hydrochloride because the
chemicals that cause the "high" users feel decompose near the temperature at which it
evaporates. Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 462; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911.
Cocaine base, on the other hand, is a substance with the chemical formula of
C17H21NO 4 . Jackson, 968 F.2d at 161; Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 462; Booker, 70 F.3d at 490-91;
Easter, 981 F.2d at 1558; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381-82. Unlike cocaine hydrochloride, cocaine
base cannot dissolve in water, and users typically smoke cocaine base. Barnes, 890 F.2d at
552; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. Because
users can smoke cocaine base it creates a faster and more intense high than cocaine hydro-
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This comment will examine the resulting circuit split over the
meaning of "cocaine base" for the purposes of applying section
841(b)(1). It will further outline why the broad definition of "cocaine base" adopted by six of the twelve circuits is the best interpretation under the current language of the statute and the absence of congressional guidance. This comment will conclude by
calling on either Congress or the Supreme Court of the United
States to resolve this circuit split.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE MEANING OF "COCAINE BASE"
Since the passage of section 841(b)(1), the circuits have adopted
various interpretations of the term "cocaine base" when applying
the statute. With the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's 2009 decision in United States v. Higgins,7 each circuit
has addressed the issue, with no clear majority forming. Of the
twelve circuits, six-the First, 8 Second, 9 Third,' 0 Fourth,"' Fifth,' 2
and Tenth Circuits13 -have adopted a broad definition of "cocaine
base," defining the term to encompass all cocaine bases, including

crack.

Five other circuits-the Sixth,' 4 Seventh,' 5 Eighth,' 6

chloride, making cocaine base the more addictive of the two. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393;
Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. Cocaine base occurs in several forms, one of which is the type
found in the coca leaf, which is commonly used to produce cocaine hydrochloride. Barbosa,
271 F.3d at 462; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 490; Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156;
Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. It is also manufactured in a number of
ways. The first type of manufactured cocaine base, better known as freebase, became
available in the 1970's and is made by dissolving cocaine hydrochloride in ammonia and an
organic solvent. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156;
Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. However, due to high production costs and the risk of explosion
during the manufacturing process, crack cocaine quickly replaced freebase as the most
prevalent cocaine base in the 1980's and beyond. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Hollis, 490 F.3d
at 1156; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. Crack cocaine is produced by dissolving cocaine hydrochloride in baking soda and water and boiling the resulting substance until it dries and
forms a solid material. Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 462; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Hollis, 490 F.3d
at 1156: Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1382. The resulting crack "rocks" became a cheap, highly.
addictive drug of choice for young and poor Americans. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Brisbane,
367 F.3d at 912.
7. 557 F.3d at 395.
8. United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st cir. 1992) (en banc) (per curiam).
9. Jackson, 968 F.2d at 162.63.
10. Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 467.
11. United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 333-34 (4th cir. 2006).
12. United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537, 543 (5th Cir. 1993).
13. Easter, 981 F.2d at 1558 n.7.
14. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 395.
15. Booker, 70 F.3d at 494.
16. United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Ninth, 17 and Eleventh Circuits' 8 -adopted a narrow definition,
interpreting "cocaine base" to include only crack cocaine for the
purposes of section 841(b). The remaining circuit-the District of
Columbia Circuit-adopted an intermediate definition, interpreting "cocaine base" to encompass crack and other forms of smokable
cocaine base.'19
A.

Circuits Adopting a Broad Definition

Six circuits have broadly defined "cocaine base" to include all cocaine bases for the purposes of section 841(b). 20 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit became the first appellate
court to adopt this broad definition in its 1992 opinion of United
States v. Lopez-Gil.21 The First Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that the term "cocaine base" does not apply solely to crack
cocaine for the purpose of section 841(b)(1). 2 2 The Lopez-Gil court
reasoned that, although Congress enacted the enhanced penalties
for "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1) mainly to combat the growing use of crack cocaine in the country, other forms of cocaine base
may exist or could exist in the future. 23 After deciding Lopez-Gil,
the First Circuit has continued to define "cocaine base" as applying to all cocaine bases for section 841(b)(1) purposes. 24
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
quickly joined the First Circuit in adopting the broad definition of
"cocaine base." In United States v. Jackson, the Second Circuit
interpreted section 841(b)(1) to apply to all cocaine bases, not just
crack. 25 The Jackson court reasoned that "[wlhile we believe that
Congress contemplated that 'cocaine base' would include [crack
17. Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156 n.4.
18. Williams, 876 F.2d at 1525.
19. United States v. Lawrence, 471 F.3d 135, 138 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
20. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
21. 965 F.2d at 1134.
22. Id. The three judge panel initially hearing the Lopez-Gil case held, in a 2-to-i decision, that '"cocaine base' means 'crack' for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)." Id. at 1130. The
First Circuit granted a petition for rehearing, and the court, sitting en banc, issued a per
curiam opinion overruling the panel's earlier decision. Id. at 1133-35.
23. Id. at 1134-35.
24. See United States v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 66, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Allen, 469 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 79-80 (1st Cir.
2006); United States v. Isler, 429 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Medina, 427
F.3d 88, 92 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that the 1993 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that defines "cocaine base" to mean only crack cocaine does not affect the interpretation of "cocaine base" for section 841(b)(1) purposes first adopted in Lopez-Gil); United
States v. Richardson, 225 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 2000).
25. 968 F.2d at 162-63.
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cocaine], Congress neither limited the term to that form [of cocaine base] in the plain language of the statute nor demonstrated
an intent to do so in the statute's legislative history."126 The Second Circuit determined that Congress chose to use "cocaine base"
as "a term of art that should be defined by reference to the scientific community from which it derives," which includes, but is not
limited to, crack cocaine. 27 Since first addressing the issue in
Jackson, the Second Circuit has applied this broad definition of
"cocaine base" to section 841(b)(1) cases. 28
Within a year of the Second Circuit deciding Jackson, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit followed suit
in United States v. Easter.29 Citing to Jackson, the Tenth Circuit
stated that "[w]hile the legislative history of [section] 841(b)(1)
indicates that Congress amended the statute due to its concern
over the increasing abuse of crack cocaine, nothing in the legislative history indicates that Congress intended 'cocaine base' to be
limited to crack cocaine." 30 Just as the Second Circuit had done
months earlier, the Tenth Circuit interpreted section 841(b)(1)
literally and held that "cocaine base" applies to all cocaine bases,
not just crack cocaine. 3 '
Several months after the Tenth Circuit decided Easter, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the
issue of defining the term "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1) in
United States v. Butler.32 The Butler court noted that while "cocaine base" includes crack cocaine, the Fifth Circuit "ha[d] not

held that crack cocaine is the only form of cocaine

base." 3 3

The

Butler court adopted the broad definition of "cocaine base," holding
that "[a]lthough a substance does not appear to be crack cocaine, it
may nevertheless be cocaine base within the meaning of §
841(b)." 34
26. Id. at 162.
27. Id. at 163. The Jackson court stated that the scientifically accepted chemical formula for cocaine base is CinH2NO 4 while the formula for cocaine is C17HsNO 4 HCl. Id. at
161.
28. See United States v. Palacio, 4 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the 1993
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that defines "cocaine base" to mean only crack
cocaine does not change the broad interpretation of "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1)
adopted by the Second Circuit in Jackson); United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 65 (2d cir.
2006); United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1997).
29. 981 F.2d at 1558.
30. Id. at 1558 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
31. Id. at 1558.
32. 988 F.2d at 541-43.
33. Id. at 542.
34. Id. at 543.

110

110

~Duquesne
Law ReviewVo.4

Vol. 48

Following Butler, no circuit joined the ranks of those broadly defining "cocaine base" until 2001. In United States v. Barbosa, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, noting the
lack of any congressional guidance on the issue, sought to determine the meaning of "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1). 35 The
Barbosa court began its analysis by noting the competing viewpoints advocated in other circuits: one defined the term "cocaine
base" as referring to "all forms of cocaine base, including crack,"
and the other "restricted the definition of cocaine base to crack
only."36

The Third Circuit found the Second Circuit's broad inter-

pretation of the statute persuasive, as "neither the plain language
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) nor the statute's legislative history reveals

that Congress limited the term 'cocaine base' to

crack." 37

The Bar-

bosa court further rejected the notion that the 1993 amendment to
the Sentencing Guidelines, which narrowly defined "cocaine base,"
had any effect on its interpretation of section 841(b)(1). 38 It held
that while the Sentencing Commission has the power to affect the
judicial interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, "its wisdom is
not germane to our construction of [the]
mandatory minimum
sentences in the drug statute itself."139 The Barbosa court concluded that "'.cocaine base' encompasses all forms of cocaine base . .
.when the mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1) are implicated." 40
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the last circuit to broadly define the term "cocaine base" in
United States v. Ramos,41 although it was not the first case in that
circuit to address this issue. Prior to Ramos, in United States v.
Fisher, the Fourth Circuit appeared to interpret the term "cocaine
base," for the purposes of section 841(b)(1), to refer to only crack
-...

35. 271 F.3d at 461-64.
36. Id. at 463-64. The Barbosa court specifically referred to the Second Circuit's Jackson and Palacio opinions supporting a broad definition and the Eleventh Circuit's MunozRealpe opinion adopting a narrow definition. Id. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying
text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Munoz-Realpe).
37. Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 466.
38. Id. at 465-66. In 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to define "cocaine base" to mean crack cocaine. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2D1. 1(c) n.D (2009).
39. Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 466. The Barbosa court rejected the idea that Congress approved of a singular definition of "cocaine base" for the purposes of both the Sentencing
Guidelines and section 841(b)(1) when it allowed passed the 1993 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines to pass. Id.
40. Id. at 467.
41. 462 F.3d at 333-34.
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cocaine. 42 However, the Ramos court, agreeing with the analysis
used by the Second Circuit in Jackson, decided to define "cocaine
base" as encompassing all cocaine bases for the purpose of section
841(b)(1). 43 After adopting the broad definition of "cocaine base,"
the Ramos court attempted to reconcile its holding with its earlier
Fisher opinion. The Ramos court stated that the court in Fisher
merely "equate[d] cocaine base with crack," inferring that the
Fisher court only made the limited holding that "cocaine base" included crack cocaine, and not that "cocaine base" referred solely to
crack cocaine for the purposes of section 841(b)(1). 44 Since the
Ninth Circuit decided Ramos, no other circuit has interpreted "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1) to mean all cocaine bases when
applying the statute.
B.

The CircuitAdopting an IntermediateDefinition

One circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, has adopted an intermediate definition for
"cocaine base," defining it as crack and other forms of smokable
cocaine base. 45 When the D.C. Circuit first addressed the issue of
defining the term "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1), it determined
that "cocaine base," at the very least, included crack cocaine. 46
The D.C. Circuit did not reexamine the meaning of cocaine base
for another 15 years after this first foray into the issue.
In 2004, the D.C. Circuit again addressed the issue in United
States v. Brisbane.47 After examining the broad and narrow approaches to defining "cocaine base," the court advocated a third
approach. 48 The Brisbane court rejected the broad approach because of ambiguity between the terms "cocaine" and "cocaine
base," and also due to some of the unusual outcomes that can re42. 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fisher court determined that the "legislative
history demonstrate[d] that Congress intended, with the enactment of [section
841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B3)(iii)]. to penalize more severely violations involving crack cocaine."
Fisher, 58 F.3d at 99. Interpreting the sections of 841(b)(1) dealing with "cocaine" and
"cocaine base" together, the Fisher court determined that "the only rational interpretation
that we can give [section 841(b)(1)] as a whole is to conclude that clause (ii) addresses cocaine powder and the other forms of cocaine identified therein, except for 'crack' cocaine
which is expressly separately addressed in clause (iii)." Id.
43. Ramos, 462 F.3d at 333-34.
44. Id. at 334 n.2.
45. Lawrence, 471 F.3d at 138. The Ninth Circuit also defined "cocaine base" as
smokable cocaine at one time, but it eventually adopted a narrow definition. See infra
notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
46. Brown, 859 F.2d at 976.
47. 367 F.3d at 911- 14.
48. Id. at 913-14.
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suit from imposing such a broad definition of "cocaine base." 49 The
Brisbane court also cited flaws in the narrow approach due to the
plain language of the statute, as well as the potential for some
new, highly- addictive form of cocaine base to appear in the future.50 The Brisbane court advocated an intermediate approach,
defining "cocaine base" to "meanfl any cocaine that is smokable." 5'
The Brisbane court supported this definition, which would include
forms of cocaine base other than just crack, because it "avoids the
difficulties inherent in the [broad] approach while not unduly narrowing the operation of the statute.152 Also, this intermediate
definition punishes only smokable cocaine more severely, a characteristic that renders cocaine more potent and addictive than
other non-smokable forms of cocaine. 58 While the Brisbane court
advocated an intermediate definition of "cocaine base," it failed to
adopt any definition. The drug involved in Brisbane was neither
smokable nor crack, so the court held that it would have reached
the same outcome regardless of whether it adopted the narrow or
intermediate definition. 54
Following Brisbane, the D.C. Circuit continued to advocate an
intermediate definition of "cocaine base," but failed to adopt it until United States v. Lawrence.55 In Lawrence, the D.C. Circuit

adopted the intermediate definition of "cocaine

base." 5 6

The Law-

rence court held that, under its prior Brisbane opinion, the enhanced penalties for "cocaine base" under section 841(b)(1) apply
to smokable cocaine, including crack. 57 The D.C. Circuit continues

49. Id. at 913. The Brisbane court specifically cited to the disparity of imposing the
same sentence for a small amount of cocaine base which requires further processing versus
a much larger amount of market-ready cocaine powder. Id.
50. Id. at 914. The Brisbane court stated that "[gliven the statute's use of the broad
term 'cocaine base,' it is unlikely Congress intended to limit the enhanced penalty provisions to one manufacturing method." Id.
5 1. Id.
52. Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 914. The Brisbane court stated that "[uln addition to crack,
[this intermediate definition] includes . . . 'traditional' freebase cocaine and cocaine paste."

Id.
53. Id. at 914. The Brisbane court determined that smokability "was extremely important [to Congress] in distinguishing crack from powdered cocaine." Id.
54. Id.
55. 471 F.3d at 138. Following Brisbane but prior to Lawrence, the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue again, but, as it did in Brisbane, it failed to define "cocaine base," this
time because the defendant possessed crack cocaine. United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d
69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
56. Lawrence, 471 F.3d at 138.
57. Id.
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to apply this interpretation of Brisbane, which defines "cocaine
base" as meaning smokable cocaine. 58
C.

CircuitsAdopting a Narrow Definition

Five circuits have concluded that the term "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1) refers to only crack cocaine. 59 In its 1989 opinion of
United States v. Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit became the first circuit to do so. 6 0 In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit narrowly defined "cocaine base" as
referring to crack cocaine only. The Williams court determined
that "those concerned with the relevant legislation understood
cocaine base to refer to crack." 61
Following Williams, the Eleventh Circuit reexamined the meaning of "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1), this time after the Sentencing Guidelines were amended to define "cocaine base" as re-

ferring to crack

only. 62

In United States v. Munoz-Realpe, the

Eleventh Circuit again concluded that "cocaine base" refers to only
crack cocaine for the purposes of section 841(b)(1). 63 The MunozRealpe court reasoned that "[b]y allowing the amendment [to the
Sentencing Guidelines] to take effect, Congress has given its [approval] to the new definition of 'cocaine base'; Congress indicated
that it intends the term 'cocaine base' to include only crack cocaine." 6 4

The court further stated that Congress gave no indica-

tion that "cocaine base" should have a different meaning under
section 841(b)(1) than under the Sentencing Guidelines. 65 Since
deciding Munoz-Realpe, the Eleventh Circuit has continued to

narrowly define "cocaine

base."6 6

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit became the next circuit to adopt the narrow definition of "cocaine
58. See United States v. Powell, 503 F.3d i47, i48 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that crack
cocaine, under Brisbane. is "cocaine base" for the purposes of section 841(b)); United States
v. Lacey, 51i F.3d 212, 2i5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that Brisbane defined "cocaine base" to
mean crack or smokable cocaine); United States v. Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584, 593 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (same); United States v. Johnson, 5i9 F.3d 478, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (same).
59. See sutpra notes 14-i8 and accompanying text.
60. 876 F.2d at 1525.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 38.
63. 21 F.3d 375, 377 (1ith Cir. i994).
64. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377. In reaching this conclusion, the Munoz-Realpe court
rejected the Second Circuit's conclusion in Palacio that "Congress has not provided guidance by approving the amendment [to the Sentencing Guidelines]." Id. at 378.
65. Id. at 378.
66. See Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1383.
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base." In United States v. Booker, the Seventh Circuit concluded,
based on the legislative history of section 841(b)(1), that "cocaine
base" refers to only crack cocaine. 67 The Booker court provided
three reasons why the legislative history supported this conclusion: (1) "a number of legislators applauded the [Anti-Drug Abuse
Act] and related legislation for providing enhanced penalties for
offenses involving crack"; (2) "Congress held hearings where experts testified concerning the emergence of crack cocaine and the
dangers that it poses"; and (3) "[m]embers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives gave much attention to the necessity of
addressing the problem of crack cocaine."168 Since deciding Booker,
the Seventh Circuit has continued to define "cocaine base" to in-

clude only crack cocaine for the purposes of section

841(b)(1). 6 9 It

has rejected adopting the broader definition of "cocaine base," concluding that defining "cocaine base" to include all cocaine bases
would create ambiguity between the "cocaine" and "cocaine base"
clauses of section 841(b)(1). 70
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit soon
followed the Seventh Circuit in defining "cocaine base" as meaning
only crack cocaine, although it failed to do so the first time it addressed the issue. When the Eight Circuit first applied the "cocaine base" clauses of section 841(b)(1) in United States v. Jackson,71 the court did not determine the meaning of "cocaine base"
for the purposes of the statute; however, the Jackson court did
apply the "cocaine base" provision of section 841(b)(1) to crack cocaine. When the Eight Circuit next addressed the issue in United
States v. Crawford, it adopted the Seventh Circuit's holding from
Booker that "cocaine base" refers to only crack cocaine. 72 The
67. 70 F.3d at 494. The Booker court specifically held that "the enhanced penalties
apply to crack cocaine, and the lesser penalties appiy to all other forms of cocaine." Id.
68. Id. at 492-93.
69. See United States v. Stephenson, 557 F.3d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Padilla, 520 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kelly, 519 F.3d 355, 362 (7th
Cir. 2008); United States v. Morris, 498 F,3d 634, 644 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Cannon, 429 F.3d 1158, 1159 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Edwards, 397 F.3d 570, 57172, 575-77 (7th Cir. 2005) (thoroughly discussing the circuit split over the definition of
"1cocaine base"); United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Reddrick, 90 F.3d 1276, 1282 (7th Cir. 1996).
70. Edwards, 397 F.3d at 575. The Edwards court specifically stated that "[i]f any form
of cocaine base (not just crack) qualifies for the enhanced penalties in [section 841(b)], then
subsection (iii) swallows subsection (ii), because 'cocaine base" (subsection (iii)) is chemically the same as 'cocaine' (subsection (ii))." Id.
71. 64 F.3d 1213, 1220 (8th Cir. 1995).
72. 83 F.3d at 966. The Crawford court specifically stated it was "persuaded" by the
holding in Booker that "Congress intended the term cocaine base to refer to 'crack."' Id.
(citing Booker, 70 F.3d at 491, 493).
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Eighth Circuit continues to apply this narrow definition of "co-

caine

base." 73

In 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the next circuit to define "cocaine base" in section
841(b)(1) as meaning only crack cocaine in United States v.
HolliS.7 4

However, Hollis was not the first occasion that the Ninth

Circuit had to define "cocaine base" for the purposes of section
841(b)(1). Prior to Hollis, the Ninth Circuit adopted an intermediate definition of "cocaine base" in United States v. Shaw.75 The
Shaw court defined the term to mean "cocaine that can be
smoked," which included crack cocaine. 76 The Shaw court reached
its conclusion based on "the sponsor's statements[] ...the legislative history, dictionary definitions, and the Sentencing Commission's interpretation.""7 The Ninth Circuit continued to use this
intermediate definition of "cocaine base" until it reexamined the
issue in Hollis.78
The Ninth Circuit in Hollis overturned these earlier cases, holding that "cocaine base" meant only crack cocaine when applying
section 841(b)(1). 79 The Hollis court based this conclusion on the
narrow definition of "cocaine base" adopted by the Sentencing
Guidelines. 80 The court reasoned that the Sentencing Guidelines
and section 841(b)(1) define "cocaine base" in the same way, which
caused it to adopt the narrow definition of "cocaine base."8 ' The
Hollis court reconciled its holding with the Ninth Circuit's earlier
holding in Shaw, stating that Shaw held that the term "cocaine
base" meant the same thing for both statutory and guideline purposes. 82 Because Shaw was decided prior to the 1993 amendment
to the Sentencing Guidelines and, according to the Hollis court, it
73. See United States v. Cole, 537 F.3d 923, 926 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Robinson, 462 F.3d 824, 825-26 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vesey, 330 F.3d 1070, 1073
(8th Cir. 2003).
74. 490 F.3d at 1155-57.
75. 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991).
76. Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that "cocaine base" means smokable cocaine under section 841(b)(1)); United States v. Davis, 36
F.3d 1424, 1434 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that "cocaine base" includes crack cocaine, but not
holding that the term is limited to only crack cocaine).
79. 490 F.3d at 1156.
80. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) n.D (2009).
81. Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156 n.4.
82. Id. The Hollis court stated that "[tihe Shaw court 'construeld] the statute and the
guidelines to be consistent with each other in their use of the term 'cocaine base.'"' Id.
(quoting Shaw, 936 F.2d at 415).
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merely held that "cocaine base" includes crack cocaine, the Hollis
court viewed Shaw as "consistent" with its holding. 83
The Sixth Circuit became the final circuit to take a position on
the meaning of "cocaine base" in 2009. In United States v. Higgins, the Sixth Circuit joined those circuits defining "cocaine base"
narrowly by holding that "the phrase 'cocaine base' in [section] 841
means 'crack cocaine." 84 The Higgins court reached this conclusion based on three reasons. First, the court stated that "it is
clear that Congress intended that the enhanced penalties for 'cocaine base' would apply to crimes involving 'crack cocaine."' 85 Second, according to the court in Higgins, section 841(b)(1) is facially
ambiguous, punishing "the possession of chemically identical substances, cocaine and cocaine base, differently." 86 The Higgins
court concluded that defining "cocaine base" as referring to only
crack cocaine "resolve[d] the ambiguity.187 Finally, the court noted
that adopting a narrow definition "create[d] consistency between
the [Sentencing] Guidelines and [section 841(b)(1)]."18 8 With the
Sixth Circuit's Higgins decision, every circuit had now weighed in
on the issue, and no clear majority opinion on the issue had
emerged.
III. ADVOCATING THE BROAD DEFINITION

Broadly interpreting "cocaine base" as applying to all cocaine
bases for section 841(b)(1) purposes provides the best definition of
the term. I base this interpretation on not only the plain language
of the statute, but also on Congress's failure to indicate that the
term should have some narrower application. As the Supreme
Court of the United States has held, "in every case involving the
construction of a statute, our starting point must be the language
employed by Congress." 89 When interpreting that language, one
must "start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."90 A person
interpreting a statute should not deviate from this assumption
unless Congress indicated that the language of the statute should
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1156, 1156 nA4
557 F.3d at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962).
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not have its "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."9 ' Further, one should not interpret a section of a statute by looking to
that section alone; rather, a person should "look to the provisions

of the whole law." 92

Beginning with the plain language of section 841(b)(1), only the
broad interpretation of "cocaine base" takes into account the ordinary meaning of the term as used by Congress. Congress enacted
section 841(b)(1) with its enhanced penalty provision applying to
"ca mixture or substance described in clause (ii) which contains

cocaine base." 9 3 Both the Sentencing Commission and many of the
circuits defining cocaine base have agreed that cocaine base comes
in three forms: (1) coca paste, which is derived from coca leaves;
(2) freebase cocaine, which is made from powder cocaine; and (3)
crack cocaine, which is also produced from powder cocaine. 94 Further, these authorities tend to agree that cocaine base and cocaine
are chemically distinguishable. 95 First, cocaine base and cocaine
91. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
92. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850)).
93. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii) (2009). Clause (ii) of sections 841(b)(1)(A)
and (B) applies to:
(I) coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine,
ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed;
(II) cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers;
(III) ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or
(MV any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the
substances referred to in subclauses (I) through (III).
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii).
94. U.S. SENTENCING COMMN, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY, ch. 2 (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/crack/exec.htm
[hereinafter SENTENCING REPORT 1]; Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 462; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393;
Booker, 70 F.3d at 490-91; Hollis, 490 F.3d at 1156; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381-82; Brisbane,
367 F.3d at 911.12.
95. Several circuits-the Sixth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits-have contended that cocamne and cocaine base have the same chemical makeup. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 392, 95;
Booker, 70 F.3d at 492; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 912. However, all three of these circuits have
noted distinct chemical differences between cocaine and cocaine base in their opinions. All
three have mentioned that cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base vaporize at different
temperatures. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911.
The Seventh Circuit noted not only the different vaporizing temperatures of the two substances, but also that cocaine hydrochloride "is easily dissolved in water," while cocaine
base "is not water soluble." Booker, 70 F.3d at 490.91.
In addition to mentioning chemical differences between the two substances, both
the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have also noted a difference in the ordinary meanings of cocaine
hydrochloride and cocaine base. Both circuits stated that cocaine hydrochloride "is known
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have different chemical formulas. 96 Next, cocaine base, unlike
cocaine, cannot dissolve in water 97 Finally, users can smoke all
three forms of cocaine base because they have a lower temperature at which they vaporize, whereas they cannot smoke cocaine. 98
Based on these various sources, "cocaine base" ordinarily refers to
a chemically distinct, smokable, and non-water soluble substance
that includes coca paste, freebase cocaine, and crack cocaine.
Any interpretation of section 841(b)(1) should not deviate from
this common definition of "cocaine base" because Congress has not
indicated that the term "cocaine base" should carry anything other
than its ordinary meaning. As both the Supreme Court and most
of the circuits addressing this issue have noted, it is clear that the
crack epidemic of the 1980's played an important role in Congress
enacting the enhanced penalty provisions applying to "cocaine
base."99 However, Congress did not use the term "crack cocaine"
or "smokable cocaine base" when it enacted section 841(b)(1) with
its two-tier sentencing scheme. 100 Nor did it provide any guidance
or impose any limitation indicating that "cocaine base" referred to
only crack cocaine or smokable forms of cocaine base. 101 Instead,
colloquially as 'cocaine"' in the United States. Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Brisbane, 367 F.3d
at 911. Cocaine base, on the other hand, refers to the "naturally occurring alkaloid..
found in the leaves of the coca plant," freebase cocaine, and crack cocaine. Id.

96. Cocaine has the chemical formula Of C17H22ClNO 4 . Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 462;
Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Easter, 981 F.2d at 1558; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381. Cocaine base, on
the other hand, has the chemical formula Ci 7 H2 1N0 4 . Jackson, 968 F.2d at 161; Barbosa,
271 F.3d at 462; Booker, 70 F.3d at 490; Easter, 981 F.2d at 1558 Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381-82.
(The Court in Jackson noted that cocaine has the formula Of C17H2iNO 4HCl. Jackson, 968
F.2d at 161. This ambiguity is of no concern, since the formula still differs from that of
cocaine base.)
97. SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 94, ch. 2; Barnes, 890 F.2d at 552; Barbosa, 271
F.3d at 462; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911.
98. SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 94, ch. 2; Barnes, 890 F.2d at 552; Barbosa, 271
F.3d at 462; Higgins, 557 F.3d at 393; Booker, 70 F.3d at 491; Sloan, 97 F.3d at 1381-82;
Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911. Cocaine base vaporizes at 98*C, 208*F and cocaine vaporizes at
198 0 C, 388*F. SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 94, ch. 2. Users cannot smoke cocaine
because it "begins to decompose at a temperature close to which the drug vaporizes .. .
and the drug] no longer produces any physiological or psychotropic effects." Id.
99. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 95-96; Jackson, 968 F.2d at 162; Fisher, 58 F.3d at 99;
Higgins, 557 F.3d at 395; Booker, 70 F.3d at 492; Shaw, 936 F.2d at 416; Easter, 981 F.2d
at 1558 n. 7; Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377.78; Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 912.
100. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). In 1986, when Congress first considered enacting the
two-tier sentencing scheme in section 841(b)(1), both the House and the Senate had different versions of the bill. "The House version provided tougher penalties for 'cocaine freebase,' while the Senate version provided penalties for 'cocaine base."' Shaw, 936 F.2d at
415. As evidenced by the current statute, Congress enacted the Senate's version of the bill.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).
101. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). In 1993, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to define "cocaine base" to mean crack cocaine. U.S. SENTENCING
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Congress adopted the broad term "cocaine base" in the statute
without defining or limiting it.102 Had Congress wanted the enhanced penalty provisions to have a narrower construction, it
could have easily used the term "crack cocaine"~ or "smokable co caine base" in the statute or restricted the definition of "cocaine
base" for section 841(b)(1) purposes. 03 Because Congress failed to
do so, the principles of statutory construction require "cocaine
base" to carry its ordinary, broad meaning for the purposes of section 841(b)(1). Therefore, based on the common language of the
statute, neither the narrow nor intermediate interpretations of
"cocaine base" should survive statutory scrutiny in the absence of
congressional guidance or action to the contrary.
Reading section 841(b)(1) as a whole only serves to strengthen
my position that those circuits adopting the broad definition of
"cocaine base" chose the best interpretation under the circumGUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.i(c) n.D (2009). The Eleventh Circuit perceived that Congress,
by allowing the Sentencing Commission to amend section 841(b)(1)'s companion section in
the Sentencing Guidelines, provided guidance on the interpretation of "cocaine base" for
purpose of the statute. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d at 377-78. The Mutnoz-Realpe court reasoned that Congress gave no indication that it intended "cocaine base" to have more than
one meaning, and by "allowing the amendment [to the Sentencing Guidelines] to take effect,. ...Congress indicated that it intend[ed] the term 'cocaine base' to include only crack
cocaine." Id.
'While applying section 841(b)(1) and its companion section in the Sentencing
Guidelines is rendered more difficult if "cocaine base" has different meanings for both the
statute and the Guidelines, amendments made by the Sentencing Commission to the
Guidelines do not affect the interpretation of the statute imposing the mandatory sentencing range. Although the Sentencing Commission has the power to provide guidance on the
sentence imposed within the statutory minimum and maximum sentencing range, it lacks
the power to establish those mandatory penalties in the statute. Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989). Further, any amendment the Sentencing Commission
makes to the Sentencing Guidelines does not change prior judicial interpretations of a
statute containing mandatory minimum and maximum sentences. Neal v. United States,
516 U.S. 284, 290 (1996). Therefore, the Sentencing Commission's 1993 Amendment to
section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines merely affected the sentencing courts applying
that section of the Guidelines and not the courts determining the meaning of "cocaine base"
in section 841(b)(1).
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). The Second Circuit confirmed this congressional inaction
on the issue, stating that "Congress used the chemical term 'cocaine base' without explanation or limitation." Jackson, 968 F.2d at 162.
103. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993). The Smith court, examining
the meaning of the term '"use' of a firearm" for the purposes of a drug trafficking statute,
stated that "[hiad Congress intended [a] narrow construction [of a statute], it could have so
indicated." Smith, 508 U.S. at 229. Because Congress failed to do so, the Court "decline[d]
to introduce that [narrow construction] on [its] own." Id.
In the case of section 841(b)(1), Congress failed to adopt a narrow construction of
the term "cocaine base." See supra note 100 and accompanying text. It not only had the
opportunity to do so when it enacted the statute, but it in fact rejected one such possible
narrow construction prior to enacting the statute. Id. This further strengthens the argument to interpret "cocaine base" broadly because Congress had the opportunity to adopt a
narrow construction and failed to do so on its own.
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stances. In clause (ii) of subsections 841(b)(1)(A) and (B), Congress adopted three very specific instances in which the statute
applies. Clause (ii) applies to any "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of": (1) coca leaves, unless the "cocaine,
ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed"; (2) "cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and
salts of isomers"; or (3) "ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers." 104 Clause (iii) then imposes the enhanced penalties of section 841(b)(1) on any "mixture or substance
described in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base." 105 The language of clause (iii) prevents courts from applying any narrow
definition of cocaine base. As it currently stands, clause (iii) applies to any mixture or substance specified in clause (ii) that contains cocaine base. This means any substance that might otherwise fall into clause (ii), such as coca paste or freebase cocaine, is
subject to the enhanced penalty provisions of clause (iii) because it
is a substance that contains cocaine base. 106 If Congress had
wanted clause (iii) of subsections 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) to apply to
only crack cocaine or smokable cocaine, then it would not have
adopted the all encompassing language it did in clause (iii).
Therefore, defining "cocaine base" to apply to all cocaine bases is
the best interpretation of the section 841(b)(1) as it is currently
enacted. 107
TV. A CALL To ACTION
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit became the twelfth and final circuit to
interpret the term "cocaine base" for the purposes of applying section 841(b)(1).1 08 As it now stands, three different interpretations
of "cocaine base" are used in the twelve circuits concerned with
104. 21 u.s.c. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (B3)(ii). Ecgonine is "a crystalline alkaloid C9 H15N03
obtained by hydrolysis of cocaine." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 718 (1986).

105.

21

u.s.c. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii) (emphasis added).

106. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
107. Although broadly defining "cocaine base" is the best interpretation based on the
current language of the statute and the absence of congressional guidance on the issue, it
might not provide the best practical definition of "cocaine base." Broadly defining "cocaine
base" can lead to some unusual results. As the D.C. Circuit noted, a person in possession of
coca paste or some other form of cocaine base that has minimal use and value without
further processing will receive a much stiffer sentence than a person possessing the same
amount of market-ready cocaine powder. Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 913. It is doubtful Congress intended such a disparity in sentences when it enacted section 841(b)(1). However,
no matter how unusual the results, the current language establishing section 841(b)(1)'s
two-tier sentencing scheme only permits a broad interpretation of the statute.
108. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381.
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this issue. 109 This split among the circuits means that two offenders possessing the same amount of the same substance can receive
vastly different sentences based solely upon the circuit in which
they go to trial. 110 It is precisely this irregularity in sentencing
that had previously caused Congress to reform the sentencing
scheme.''
As both the First and Seventh Circuits have suggested, either
Congress or the Supreme Court of the United States must intervene on this issue. 12 The Supreme Court can intercede and adopt
an interpretation that will apply to all the circuits, removing the
disparity that this circuit split has created. Preferably, Congress
can step in and remove any uncertainty as to the interpretation of
the statute. It can either amend the language of the statute if it
prefers some narrower construction or provide some guidance
within section 841(b)(1) to indicate how broadly or narrowly courts
should define the term "cocaine base.""13 No matter which body
109. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text. Six circuits decided to define "cocaine
base" in the enhanced penalty clause of section 841(b)(1) as applying to all cocaine bases,
five other circuits chose to only apply the enhanced penalty clause to crack cocaine, while a
single circuit interpreted "cocaine base" as encompassing crack cocaine and smokable cocaine base. Id.
110. As a hypothetical example of this disparity, consider a defendant arrested for possession of 500 grams of freebase cocaine. If the defendant is convicted of the crime in a
court in the Seventh Circuit, which narrowly defines "cocaine base" in section 841(b)(1), he
would receive a sentence in the range of five to forty years as imposed by section
841(b)(1)(B)(ii). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii); Booker, 70 F.3d at 494. Had the defendant
instead been convicted in the Third Circuit, which broadly defines "cocaine base" when
applying section 841(b)(1), he would face a sentence of 10 years to life under section
841(b)(1)(A)(iii). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii); Barbosa, 271 F.3d at 467.
111. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366. The Supreme Court stated that Congress had enacted
sweeping sentencing reform in 1984 in response to "[flundamental and widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties and the disparities" of the sentencing scheme. Id. In fact,
Congress expressly stated within the Sentencing Reform Act that during sentencing courts
should consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
(2009).
112. United States v. Allen. 469 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Edwards.
397 F.3d 570, 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2005). The Sentencing Commission has also suggested
that Congress amend section 841(b)(1) to resolve the circuit split. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND) FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, Chapter 8
(May 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.htm [hereinafter SENTENCING REPORT 2].
113. Two sources have even suggested modifying or entirely eliminating section
841(b)(1)'s two-tiered sentencing scheme. The Sentencing Commission has not sought to
eliminate the two-tier scheme but has suggested modifying the cocaine to crack cocaine
ratio to no more than twenty-to-one rather than the statute's current 100-to-one ratio.
SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 112, Chapter 8. In April 2009, the Justice Department
endorsed a plan that would eliminate the two-tier sentencing scheme of section 841(b)(1)
altogether and punish cocaine and cocaine base possession equally. Carrie Johnson, Justice
Department Backs Plan to Eliminate Cocaine Sentencing Disparity, WASH. POST, Apr. 30,
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ultimately intervenes, it is clear that this issue is ripe for intervention.
Andrew King

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp2009,
dyn/conttent/article/2009/04/29/AR2009O4290155l.html.

